Donald Trump vs Hillary Clinton today !

 

The first presidential debate is Monday night. Hillary Clinton has some work to do. She was probably expecting to go into the first debate ahead by double digits. WHY ISN’T SHE LIKE, 50 POINTS AHEAD????? She certainly can’t figure it out.
The latest ABC News/Washington Post poll shows Hillary and Trump at a virtual tie, with 46 percent and 44 percent respectively. (Gary Johnson has 5 percent and Jill Stein has 1 percent.)
I used to wonder the same thing, but my younger sister was recently polled. I was so excited when she told me and asked her who it was, but she couldn’t remember. Because she’s a dork.



And as usual, here’s RCP’s current national polling average:

A whopping 74 percent of Americans say they plan to watch the first presidential debate. It’ll be interesting to see what the national poll numbers look like after that.

Morocco court sentences West Sahara activists

A Moroccan military court has handed prison sentences, including life terms, to a group of Sahrawis accused of killing members of the security forces in the Western Sahara in 2010.

Eight of the 24 defendants in court in Rabat on Sunday were jailed for life and four received 30-year prison terms, the MAP agency reported.

Two of the accused who received the lightest sentences, two years in jail, have already served their terms in custody.

A 25th defendant was tried in absentia and given a life sentence.

Some of the defendants had feared receiving the death sentence for the crimes of "forming criminal gangs, and violence against the security forces leading to deaths and the mutilation of corpses" in 2010, when authorities dismantled a camp where thousands of Sahrawis were living.

Authorities say 11 people died in the violence, among them members of the security forces, and 70 were wounded.

The politically-charged trial opened on February 1 after repeated delays.

Observers and rights groups have expressed concern over claims by the accused that they were tortured in custody. They also insist that the trial should have been held in a civilian court.

Amnesty International condemned the military trial as "flawed from the outset", and said torture claims should be probed.

At dawn on November 8, 2010, Moroccan security forces moved to dismantle the Gdim Izik camp near Laayoune, the main city in the disputed Western Sahara, which thousands of Sahrawis had set up in protest over their living conditions.

The intervention sparked clashes that spread to Laayoune, where businesses and public buildings were looted and torched.

The Western Sahara issue is a highly sensitive subject in Morocco, which annexed the former Spanish colony in 1975 in a move not recognised by the international community.

Morocco has proposed broad autonomy for the territory under its sovereignty, but this is rejected by Polisario Front separatists who insist on the right of the Sahrawi people to a referendum on self-determination.

The military court handed down its sentences overnight on Saturday after retiring to deliberate in the afternoon. 

Protests were held outside the court during the trial, though the scene was calm on Saturday night.

After the verdicts were announced, some relatives of the dead security officers expressed their satisfaction at the court's decisions.
Source:Agencies 

Morocco’s Engagement with the Sahel Community

The Arab Spring’s echoes in sub-Saharan Africa are more complex than initially imagined; for example, much has been made of how Libya’s crisis has led to Mali’s crisis, but rather less has been said about how the transitions in North Africa may set the stage for new forms of security cooperation in the Sahel. Such possibilities are quietly taking shape now, even as the world struggles to find a multilateral response to northern Mali. A prime example is the upcoming January 2013 meeting of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) in N’djamena, Chad, where Morocco will likely continue its steps to take command of the organization.

CEN-SAD was set adrift by the Arab Spring, which unmoored the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and shook the African Union (AU) by removing its key supporter, Muammar Qaddafi. The least known of the AU’s eight regional economic communities (RECs), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States proffered lofty and increasingly improbable visions of economic union and political/cultural exchange for an ever-growing swath of the continent; it mushroomed from six to 28 members over thirteen years through Libyan largesse. By late 2011, however, the organization looked likely to fade along with the death of Libya’s dictator. 

Meanwhile, the Arab Spring opened up new partnership opportunities for Morocco, Africa’s only non-AU member country, which has been long isolated by the Western Sahara conflict and its rivalry with neighboring Algeria. With the polarizing personalities of Qaddafi and Zine el Abidine Ben Ali gone, there may be glimmers of a new hope for one of the African Peace and Security Architecture’s most troubled northern REC: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), whose revival Tunisia looks set to push forward. Also about a year ago, African states began lobbying Morocco to revitalize CEN-SAD. 

Of these alliances, CEN-SAD must be particularly attractive to Morocco, for several reasons. Its preeminence in the organization will likely go uncontested; no other member has the spur, stature, and stability to lead it. Other potential leaders (namely Nigeria and Kenya) are firmly ensconced as anchor states in existing, functional RECs—Nigeria in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Kenya in the East African Community (EAC), among others. Egypt remains deeply embroiled in regional diplomacy and its own internal affairs, and Algeria’s absence from CEN-SAD should allow Morocco free reign to guide the organization independent of its neighbor. Moreover, the Kingdom may enjoy novel forms of influence within a REC based on a projection of Africa’s Arab and Muslim North into the continent’s South; CEN-SAD apparently an abbreviation taken from Arabic letters sin and sad (for al-sahil and al-sahara), covers over half of Africa’s nations, and what unites such a diverse set of countries—from the Gambia to the Comoros, and Somalia to Sierra Leone—more than any connection to ecoclimatic or environmental conditions, is Islam. With the exception of Algeria, CEN-SAD is the REC of all Muslim-majority African states (as well as member states with significant Muslim minorities)—convenient for a king whose authority rests in part on his position as “Commander of the Faithful” (amir al-muminin). 

More importantly, however, leadership of CEN-SAD would allow Rabat to engage in a region where it has deep and direct security concerns. Moroccan officials regularly reference the south and southeast as major sources of concern, especially for rising transnational threats. The bordering Sahel is a zone of illegal immigration; of illicit trafficking in weapons, arms, and people; and of operation and sanctuary for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and a proliferating set of armed groups. These challenges are clearly costing Morocco; as more illegal migrants settle in the country, more trafficking corrupts Saharawi youth, and more Islamist terrorist attacks threaten metropolitan centers and tourist hubs. While weathering the Arab Spring, the Moroccan government adopted a new constitution in July 2011 that restates Morocco’s foreign policy priorities, with notable prominence given to sub-Saharan Africa. The Sahel is explicitly highlighted, and it follows only the Maghreb and the umma (and precedes the Mediterranean world) in the document’s listing of Morocco’s regional priorities. For all of these reasons, the country has an interest in adopting and adapting the ready-made structure of CEN-SAD—an organization with a history not only of economic interaction and cultural exchange, but of deployment of multi-national forces for peacekeeping operations (as it did in 2001 with the Central African Republic). 

Last June, Rabat took the first step: hosting a CEN-SAD meeting aimed at revitalizing the organization and shifting its focus toward security. The upcoming N’djamena meeting should provide further insight into Morocco’s intentions and CEN-SAD’s prospects and direction. Key indicators to watch include responsibilities and authorities delegated to CEN-SAD’s new peace and security committee; financial commitments made to CEN-SAD by member states, particularly Morocco; proposals to locate any CEN-SAD organs outside of Tripoli, Libya (where the organization is presently housed); the role taken by weighty members, such as Egypt, Senegal, Nigeria, and Kenya; and the emphasis placed on security questions in CEN-SAD’s west (like Mali and Nigeria) rather than its east (such as Somalia and Sudan–South Sudan). Last month in N’djamena, Chadian government officials described a scenario in which peripheral nations peel away, no longer drawn to the table by Qaddafi’s carrots (or sticks), and CEN-SAD tightens to a ten-country community focused exclusively on the REC’s west. This would prime the organization for action in places like northern Mali. Finally, beyond the meeting itself, any reaction from Algeria regarding a Moroccan-led CEN-SAD reboot will have major implications. A particularly interesting and thorny situation for Morocco would be an Algerian application for membership. 

The January 2013 summit under the presidency of Chad will mark an advance, but CEN-SAD will remain hard pressed to make any quick-fuse intervention in the Mali crisis. Nonetheless, this improbable REC may eventually find itself engaged there and in the Sahel more broadly—whether in the current crisis or another down the road. The Arab Spring’s reverberations are full of contradictions and ironies. It may be that CEN-SAD’s founder had to die for the organization to live, and that the REC’s anchor state will shift from one of the AU’s strongest advocates, Libya, to its only non-member, Morocco. The straight line from the Libya crisis to the Mali crisis is rather clear, but the ultimate meaning of the Arab Spring for peace and security in Africa remains to be seen.

Dr. Benjamin P. Nickels is an assistant professor of transnational threats and counter-terrorism at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. This article is in part based on direct conversations with Moroccan, Libyan, and Chadian officials in Washington, D.C. and N'djamena, Chad.

http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/03/morocco-s-engagement-with-sahel-community/ez1c

Benjamin P. Nickels

Morocco Is on the Path to Change

Hicham Ben Abdallah el Alaoui is a consulting professor at Stanford University's Center for Democracy Development and the Rule of Law, and is the president of the Moulay Hicham Foundation. He is a cousin of King Mohammed VI of Morocco and third in line for the throne.

The Arab monarchies have survived the turmoil in the Middle East for several reasons. First, the monarchic institution remains deeply linked to national identity in many of these countries because of anticolonial struggle and the historical importance of the institution itself. Second, monarchies have traditionally arbitrated conflicts between different groups and classes, acting as benevolent caretakers of society. They have also allowed other institutions, like parliaments, to represent the people, thus staying above the political fray.

Like Jordan, Morocco is trying to satisfy its citizens by liberalizing instead of democraticizing.

These factors have earned Arab monarchs a respite from the wave that swept away regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and possibly Yemen, but the respite will not last forever.

In the Gulf, enormous oil revenue has permitted monarchies to initiate new welfare and development programs to deflect public pressure. Geopolitics matter too: it has become clear that Saudi Arabia will not permit the crisis in Bahrain to truly threaten the existence of its monarchy. Likewise, at the international level, the United States and the European Union have little desire to encourage any more instability in this economically vital area.

The issue of monarchical survival has become inextricably entangled with the dynamics of Sunni-Shiite sectarian tension, which pits Iran against the Arab Gulf kingdoms. This discourse has grown hegemonic: not just the monarchies but also oppositionists have internalized these fears, blunting the demand for political reform.

Morocco and Jordan — the two oil-poor monarchies — are trying to satisfy their citizens by liberalizing instead of democratizing. They have turned to controlled political openings cloaked in the language of freedom but intended to perpetuate the status quo. Limited constitutional reforms, tolerance of more opposition and new parliamentary elections are welcome steps, but such measures do not devolve power away from the palace.

And such policies cannot indefinitely quiet the restive middle classes, who are no longer satisfied with constrained pluralism and demand genuine participation. What they desire is not revolution but reformation toward constitutional monarchy, a new system of governance that embodies the spirit of democracy while retaining the historical role of monarchism in these societies. The path to change may be uneven, and sometimes even chaotic, but it has begun.

Newyorktimes

Morocco seeks airline partner from Gulf or beyond

Morocco would rather pursue a strategic partnership for Royal Air Maroc (RAM), with an airline from one of the Gulf states or beyond, than sell a stake in its flag carrier, government ministers said late on Monday.

A government source last month said that partnership proposals included the sale of a minority stake to a leading Gulf airline.

“No decision has been taken yet, but my opinion is that it is better to do a partnership rather than sell a stake,” Tourism Minister Lahcen Haddad said on the sidelines of a tourism conference in Rabat.

“RAM is strong in the West African and European markets. It’s therefore more logical to seek partners that are stronger in other parts of the world.”

The North African country aims to boost tourism to help it to tackle a budget deficit worsened by the euro zone crisis and increased spending to quash Arab Spring protests, but it lacks the financial clout to buy aircraft that can bring holidaymakers from around the world.

About 70 percent of tourists visiting Morocco come from the euro zone, with the rest mostly travelling from Gulf Arab countries.

Morocco, which has been thinking about reducing its stake in RAM for more than 20 years, led major efforts to restructure the group last year in a move that tourism operators said was a sign the state was preparing for a sale.

“It’s obvious that a middle-size airline like RAM needs a strategic partnership with another airline. We will see if it is going to be from the Gulf, from Europe or from America,” industry minister Abdelkader Aamara said in Rabat.

With a relatively modest fleet of about 40 medium and long-haul aircraft, Royal Air Maroc has sought to develop Casablanca as a regional hub, connecting mostly poorly served west African capitals to Europe and North America.

alarabiya